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War on Terror Symposium
A Deadly Complexity: Law, Social
Movements and Political Violence
Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly*
The increasing quagmire of the "war on terror" casts doubt
on the legal devises that were employed to rationalise it. This is
especially the case in Iraq, and is true both in relation to the
international use of force and anti-terrorist legal discourse.
With regards to the latter, some argue for a recalibration of
state response within the parameters of existing discourse
(suggesting for instance, that some kind of better 'balance' needs
to be struck between the interests of protecting society and
upholding human rights). This article suggests that the problem
lies deeper-that the simplistic structure of dominant anti-
terrorist legal discourse obscures the complexity of law's role in
the interactions of the state and its violent challengers; and that
dominant 'anti-terrorist' legal discourse may contribute to the
increasingly obvious problem of counter production in the state
of exception.
Dominant discourses proceed from an assumption that a
revised legal regime, loosening restrictions on military/security
agencies, will yield consequential anti-terrorist benefits. The
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'torture' debate captures the issue well, though similar
structures of argumentation appear in other fields. One stream
in this debate invokes the rhetoric of the 'rule of law' and human
rights, while arguing that certain formerly taboo subjects need
to be revisited These include loosening prohibitions on torture
or rethinking the definition of inhuman treatment.1 Most [in-]
famously, Dershowitz has argued for the introduction of judicial
'torture warrants', authorising the administration of
'excruciating' pain: torture, it is argued, tends to happen
anyway, and a formal procedure would provide some safeguards.
Ignatieff, while distancing himself from Dershowitz's proposal,
has suggested the employment of a harsh, law-based
interrogation regime on the basis that society may choose the
'lesser evil' of exceptional anti-terrorist measures (limiting
human rights) to 'respond to an attack', 2 in preference to the
'greater evil of its own destruction' (by terrorism). His particular
recipe (focusing on sensory deprivation and stress-creation) is
strikingly similar to that condemned as 'inhuman and degrading
treatment' in Northern Ireland by the European Court of
Human Rights.3
The other related stream in dominant anti-terrorist
discourse, that associated with the 'Bush doctrine', manifests
the kind of ambiguous attitude towards the rule of law found in
John Yoo's memos challenging legal limitations on Presidential
power in the 'war on terror'.4 This approach tends to stress the
need for pre-existing international and domestic legal norms
(whether in relation to torture or otherwise) to yield to the
exigencies of executive interpretation and action, which may
entail claims of extra-ordinary law-making powers.
The modelling employed in much of these discourses tends
to be relatively rigid and straightforward: a 'crisis-response
model' dominates, the central issue becoming the liberal
democratic state's legal response to the crisis of terrorism. In
this response, legal norms, whether created through
1. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 156 (2002).
2. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF
TERROR 2 (2004). Ignatieff subsequently appears to have partly retreated from this
position. Michael Ignatieff, If Torture Works..., PROSPECT, Apr. 2006.
3. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 25, 26 (1978), discussed
infra note 85.
4. Memorandum from the Office of the Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A,
for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002).
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conventional processes or a claimed extraordinary executive
right, are assumed have top-down impact upon their targets in a
predictable way. Discussion of their 'effectiveness' tends to focus
on the individual hypothetical case (typically the 'ticking bomb'
scenario involving the possible torture of a suspected terrorist,
believed to have information about an already-planted bomb).5
Original empirical data on the targets of anti-terrorist powers
are rarely produced, reflecting a more general lacuna; as
Crenshaw points out, 'the study of terrorism still lacks the
foundation of extensive primary data based on interviews and
life histories of individuals engaged in terrorism'.6 The result, is
heavy reliance on secondary data (as with Ignatieff), or
hypothetical scenarios (in the case of Dershowitz), with
recommendations for action that have little empirical
grounding, a problem that as Brannan has pointed out, afflicts
'terrorism' studies in general. 7 Simplistic, reductive accounts
abound, with terrorist activism being explained in terms of the
pathological, psychological states,8 greed, or in the case of
female activists, as "terrorism for the sake of love [of a male]." 9
Such simplistic modelling brings a number of problems, not
least that it risks obscuring the workings of a highly complex
(and deadly) phenomenon, generating 'remedies' that may have
the opposite effects to those intended. It is undoubtedly true
that terrorist attacks present the state with a crisis that
demands response; to this extent the 'crisis-response' model is
viable. Where it becomes suspect is where the relationship is
viewed as uni-directional or uni-dimensional. There is a well
established 'social movement' literature (overlooked in anti-
terrorist legal discourse), suggesting that the state's response
('repression') may function as a stimulus to the mobilisation of
5. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 1, at 142-63.
6. Martha Crenshaw, The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21"
Century 21 POL. PSYCHOL. 405, 410 (2000).
7. See generally David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, & N. T. Anders
Strindberg, Talking to "Terrorists": Towards an Independent Analytical Framework
for the Study of Violent Substate Activism, 24 STUD. IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM 3
(2001).
8. For a critique, see Charles L. Ruby, Are Terrorists Mentally Deranged?, 2
ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES AND PUB. POL'Y 15 (2002).
9. For critiques of such reductive accounts see Miranda Alison, Women as
Agents of Political Violence: Gendering Security, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 447 (2004),
and Brigitte L. Nacos, The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar
Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism, 28
STUD. IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM 435 (2005).
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its violent challengers, leading to fresh terrorist 'response' which
in turn provides a stimulus for further state action. Recognition
of this dynamic also serves to question the utility of the
'balancing' metaphor, routinely employed in anti-terrorist legal
discourse. While the metaphor may be viable in relation to
restrictions that impact equally across society (for instance a
requirement that all car occupants wear seat belts), it becomes
more problematic when restrictions impact largely on suspect,
out-groups identified by ethnicity and appearance (as Ronald
Dworkin points out, the dominant group may experience
scarcely any additional restrictions). 10 It is from the out-group,
upon which the weight of the 'balance' falls, that violent
challengers are likely to spring.
Dominant legal analyses also tend to overlook a related,
well-developed, socio-legal literature on law's contributory role
to mobilisation of protest groups, which rejects simple 'top-down'
models of law's operation. As a consequence of these omissions
and simplifications, anti-terrorist legal analyses have yet to
provide an adequate theorisation of law's potential counter-
productive effects. Rather than the simplistic models frequently
employed, interactive modelling of a 'repression-mobilisation
nexus' may offer much more valuable insights that need to be
integrated into legal analyses. 1
This article aims to develop legal thinking in this sphere by
providing an account of law's operation in violent conflict that
engages with the possibility that in 'anti-terrorist' state action,
law may be implicated in the mobilisation of the state's violent
challengers. Part 1 sets out a theoretical framework for a
dynamic modelling of law's role in a violently conflicted 'rule of
law' state. In place of simple crisis-response formulae, it posits
an interactive model, exploring law's role in both the repression
and mobilisation of the state's violent challengers. The article
draws on established work on 'legal mobilization,"12
supplementing this with social movement theory insights on the
mobilisation of violent groups. It hypothesises a process of
'legally implicated mobilisation' which takes account both of
10. Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, 49 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb.
28, 2002 at 44. See also Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of
Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191 (2003)..
11. The literature on the nexus is explored below infra note 34.
12. For a collection of major contributions published from 1976-2003, see
MICHAEL W. McCANN, LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2006).
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law's presence and its partial absence in 'legal grey zones'
during violent conflict, and it suggests how law, viewed in these
diffuse terms, may impact key elements of the mobilisation of
the state's violent challengers. It also examines the question of
the 'messages' sent about law to a variety of actors in such
situations, exploring how such messaging may contribute to the
process described by Tilly, whereby the democratic state's
mechanisms tend to "dampen the processes that generate
violent contention."13
Part 2 addresses the gap identified by Crenshaw, applying
this framework and grounding it, by reference to fresh,
interview-based qualitative data on the mobilisation of violent
non-state actors. The subject group was composed of activists
linked to the main violent, anti-state participant in the
Northern Ireland conflict, the Provisional Irish Republican
Army ('IRA'). The hypothesis developed in Part 1 implicates law
in a process whereby some elements in the state's anti-
terrorist/repressive activities could be expected to contribute to
the mobilisation of violent challengers. Analysis of the dataset
aims to identify which elements might be particularly
implicated. It also enables exploration of the complexities of
'messaging' around law; of the paradoxes of law's role both as a
tool of repression and a point of resistance; and of the neglected
question of possible gendered dimensions in the experience of
repression and mobilisation in the liberal state.
While the Northern Ireland conflict differed in many
respects from the 'war on terror', at a high level of abstraction
there are sufficient points of correspondence to make
comparisons viable. Both conflicts involve liberal democratic
states with a formal commitment to the rule of law (the UK is a
common actor); and both involve entrenched, organised, political
violence with complex ethnic dimensions yielding identifiable
'out groups'. Points of comparison and difference, and possible
lessons for the broader 'war', are examined in the conclusions.
1. LAW AND MOBILISATION
Synthesising a dynamic framework for exploring the law's
role in the mobilisation of violent challengers in the 'rule of law'
state faces three challenges: (1) the literature on 'legal
13. CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 44 (2003).
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mobilisation' rarely concerns itself with structured violent
mobilisation; (2) the literature on structured violent
mobilisation rarely concerns itself with law; and (3) since the
liberal state displays an axiomatic commitment to the rule of
law, it may be difficult to ascertain whether specific behavioural
features of the state are explicable in terms of democracy or in
terms of law. This article addresses the first two challenges by
bringing together the relevant legal and non-legal literatures,
and the third by drawing on Abel's exploration of law in
apartheid-era South Africa 4-- a violently conflicted, non-
democratic, and racist state that paradoxically claimed a
commitment to the rule of law.
LAW'S RELATIVE AUTONOMY AND LEGAL GREY ZONES
Debates on the relationship of law, power and violence tend
to revolve, explicitly or implicitly, around the utility of the rule
of law. While a variety of meanings are available, at the
concept's core is a rejection of arbitrariness: the state is to act in
accordance with predetermined ascertainable law; there is to be
equality before the law; and an independent judiciary is to
adjudicate on claimed infractions. The concept does not provide
an account of how states actually behave: degrees of
arbitrariness and illegality characterise the behaviour of all
states; judicial decisions can be contradictory, and frequently
accommodate themselves to the interests of dominant groups;
and rulings challenging such interests may be reversed by fresh
legislation. Claims that law is apolitical are unconvincing-
hence critical legal scholars' portrayal of law as little more than
a superstructural device, buttressing the interests of dominant
(hegemonic) groups. Other analyses, while recognising law's
hegemonic quality, nevertheless point to its ambivalent position
as a potential (if unlikely) check on the power of dominant
groups. On this view, law displays elements of a living, partly
self-contained system.15 In Abel's formulation, law is "'relatively
autonomous," influenced by economic infrastructure, pressured
by political forces, shaped by the social system, but not fully
14. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-1994 (1995).
15. Abel uses the term 'autopoiesis' to describe the phenomenon, drawing on




determined by any of them. 16 This view is crucial to Abel's
analysis of law's ambivalent position under apartheid, offering a
route to identifying the specificity of the legal contribution,
rather than the democratic one, in state behaviour.
When faced with violent challenges, pressures for departure
from the rule of law (or in Weberian terms from 'formal
rationality') are likely to be especially strong,17 particularly in
relation to the interrogation of prisoners and the use of lethal
force. This departure may be indicated by the imposition of a
formal or de facto 'state of exception.' A variety of factors limits
the reach of domestic law on state action: norms may be
ambiguous or lacking; prosecutorial discretion may shield state
operatives; the judiciary may display marked deference;
illegality may involve covert operations in which links with the
state may be difficult to prove; ouster clauses may limit
domestic courts' jurisdiction; anti-terror/emergency legislation
may provide sweeping powers; and jurisdictional issues may be
exploited to stymie legal challenges. International law
potentially provides an 'objective' correction, but the 'bite' of
international law in such situations can be limited by the
hegemonic pull of powerful states on the law;18 by derogation
and reservation provisions; by the 'margin of appreciation'
doctrine; by strategies of non-ratification; and through
obfuscation of fact-finding.
A variety of legal literatures touches upon the phenomenon
of law's limited effective reach in states of exception. The
criminological literature increasingly looks at the issue under
the heading of 'state deviance' and 'state crime'. 19 In human
rights and international humanitarian law, the debate tends to
be couched in terms of the need to challenge post-conflict
immunity for those who have acted with impunity during
conflict. 20 Agamben has been interpreted as seeing the state of
16. Abel, supra note 8, 523. See also ALAN HUNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL
MOVEMENT IN LAW (1978).
17. ISAAC D. BALBUS, THE DIALECTICS OF LEGAL REPRESSION: BLACK REBELS
BEFORE THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTS 4 (1973).
18. See generally UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (Michael Byers and Georg Nolte eds., 2003), and Colm
Campbell, 'Wars on Terror' and Vicarious Hegemons: the UK, International Law,
and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 321, 328 (2005).
19. See, e.g., Ronald C. Kramer & Raymond. J. Michalowski, War, Aggression
and State Crime: A Criminological Analysis of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq,
45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 446 (2005).
20. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and
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exception (manifest in the 'war on terror')21 as co-terminus with
a regime of 'anomie' (lawlessness);22 another interpretation is
that Agamben sees zones of anomie and lawfulness co-existing
ambiguously in the state of exception.23 His foundational
analysis is that the exceptionality of anomie rather than a
liberal commitment to the rule of law is at sovereignty's core.
This jurisprudential view forces attention to the law's limited
presence, but risks overlooking socio-legal insights into the
capacity of the ideology of the rule of law to take on a life of its
own, irrespective of the will of the sovereign.
The metaphor most frequently used to describe the
phenomenon of law's limited reach in the 'war on terror' is that
of the 'legal black hole', 24 but in reality such high-definition,
binary divisions (within versus outside law's reach) are rarely
identifiable. Violent conflict tends to be characterized by
ambiguity, opacity, lack of accountability, and indeterminacy as
regards the lawfulness of state action. Rather than 'black holes',
'legal grey zones' provide a much more appropriate metaphor; of
the two readings of Agamben discussed earlier, that which
portrayed anomie and lawfulness co-existing ambiguously seems
preferable.
If this concept of legal grey zones is tied to the earlier
discussions of law's autonomy and of the importance of an
ideological commitment to the rule of law, two conclusions
emerge. The first is that in the (emergency) legal grey zone, law
still retains its relative autonomy, but the extent of that
autonomy is itself part of the ambiguity. The second is that
there are a number of reasons for suggesting that law is
implicated in all the state's action in these legal grey zones:
obstacles to bringing matters before the courts create a high
degree of indeterminacy as to which behavior is and is not
lawful; and the difficulty of excluding a legal mandate for a
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 449
(1990).
21. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 66-73 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ.
of Chicago Press 2005).
22. Fleur Johns, Guantdnamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception, 16
EuR. J. INT'L L. 613, 623-28 (2005).
23. E.g., when Agamben analyzes the status necessitatus in the state of
exception as "an ambiguous and uncertain zone in which de facto proceedings ...
pass over into law ... that is, a threshold where fact and law seem to become
undecidable," Agamben, supra note 21, at 29.
24. See generally Johan Steyn, Guantdnamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2004).
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particular action means that law may be implicated in a positive
sense. In a negative sense, where the state can be shown to have
acted without legal mandate, this represents a failure to live up
to an ideological commitment to the rule of law, with the result
that law is implicated by a failure of reach.
LEGAL MOBILISATION, LEGAL DYNAMISM AND SOCIAL CONFLICT
Conceptualising law as a relatively autonomous
phenomenon provides a platform for exploration of the use of
law by protest groups, while recognising law's hegemonic
quality. The question of law's role in the mobilisation of
campaigning groups first emerged in the 1970s in the United
States, reflecting legal academics' concern to connect their field
with developing social movement theory which sought to explain
the contemporary emergence of a plethora of protest
movements.
A key socio-legal contribution came with Scheingold's attack
on liberal assumptions as constituting no more than a 'myth of
rights.'2 This myth overemphasised the capacity of symbolic
litigation to effect social change, and underemphasised the
'inertial' capacity of law to sustain the status quo. Rather than
reject legal claim-making, Scheingold propounded a 'politics of
rights,' viewing law in instrumental terms as contributing to a
strategy of 'political mobilisation' for social change. This
suggests that law occupies two positions: in one, legal tactics are
part of an integrated campaigning strategy. The other, radical
view, projects mobilisation as flowing from legal claim-making,
when "[u]nder the right circumstances rights can be used as a
catalytic agent [of mobilisation."26 This stream of thought has
been developed in exploring law's role in mobilising relatively
peaceful social movements. The need to spread the field of
inquiry, particularly in relation to post-9/11 repression and
violence in the democratic state, has been clearly recognised. 27
To take account of law's role in contemporary conflict, it is
necessary to set out some key insights from current social
25. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 6 (2d ed., Univ. of Michigan Press 2004) (1974).
26. Id. at 213.
27. See Christian Davenport, Repression and Mobilization: Insights from
Political Science and Sociology, in REPRESSION AND MOBILIZATION: SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, PROTEST, AND CONTENTION VOL. 21(Christian Davenport, Hank
Johnston and Carol Mueller eds., 2005).
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movement literature on violent mobilisation. The term 'social
movement' is a broad one, facilitating analyses of such diverse
pheonomena as U.S. labor groups and Latin American agrarian
campaigning organisations. 28 Della Porta's ground-breaking
study of German and Italian terrorist groups amply
demonstated the viability of this analytical device in relation to
structured violent activism.29
In contrast to earlier grievance-based theories of conflict
eruption, social movement theory, in its more developed form,
argues that while grievances are relatively constant, social
movements emerge only in particular circumstances.
Consequently, the circumstances more than the grievance
explain why a movement develops at a given time. The theory
has hardened in recent years to emphasise three sets of factors
in explaining movements' emergence and development: 'political
opportunities,' 'mobilising structures' and 'framing processes,'
creating a need to locate law's role in the mobilisation process
under each of these headings. This requires that the meanings
of these and related terms be explored.
Social Movement Theory and the 'Repression-Mobilisation'
Nexus
While individual motivation is likely to be heterogeneous,
spanning antagonism, self-interest, and altruism, sustained
group mobilisation is taken to occur only when appropriate
conditions under all three headings above are met. 'Political
opportunities' refer to the "structure of political opportunities
and constraints confronting the movement."30 The precise
political opportunities available at any given time are unique to
national contexts, depending on such factors as the nature of the
state (democratic/open, authoritarian/closed), and of precise
electoral arrangements.
'Mobilising structures' refer to "collective vehicles, informal
28. For a series of essays covering the Latin American spectrum from agrarian
reformers to guerrilla groups see SUSAN ECKSTEIN, POWER AND POPULAR PROTEST:
LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Susan Eckstein ed., 2001).
29. See generally DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, POLITICAL
VIOLENCE, AND THE STATE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ITALY AND GERMANY
(1995).
30. DOUG MCADAM, JOHN D. MCCARTHY, & MAYER N. ZALD, COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING
STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS 2 (1996).
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as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in
collective action."31 Where movements survive beyond the
emergent phase, these structures are likely to be expressed in
the formation of 'social movement organizations.' Successful
structures are taken to have developed in order to make
efficient use of available resources. 'Framing processes' refer to
the "conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion
shared understandings of the world and of themselves that
legitimate and motivate collective action."3 2 This definition
encompasses a range of cultural and ideational elements,
providing collective actors with a shared frame of reference. The
emergence of a social movement organisation is therefore
explained in terms of the relationship between the opportunities
a political system affords, the availability of resources from
which structures are built, and organisation members' shared
understandings.
A related literature focuses on the state's dealings with
challengers and protesters (violent or otherwise)-on
'repression,' defined as "obstacles by the state (or its agents) to
individual and collective actions by challengers."3 3 Interaction
between challengers and the state is explored under the rubric
of the 'repression-mobilisation nexus.' Whereas legal exploration
tends to focus on effectiveness in individual cases, social
movement theory's modelling offers the promise of more
nuanced, dynamic exploration. The repression-mobilisation
nexus demands examination of both the impact of repression on
mobilisation, and of mobilisation on repression.
The result has been a vast range of theoretical and
empirical explorations of these interactions, 34 resulting in
31. Id. at3.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Clark McPhail and John D. McCarthy, Protest Mobilization, Protest
Repression, and Their Interaction, in Davenport et al, supra note 27, drawing on
CHARLES TILLY, POPULAR CONTENTION IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1758-1834, 136 (1995).
34. The literature is vast. Sources drawn upon include: Ronald Francisco, Why
Are Collective Conflicts "Stable"?, in PATHS TO STATE REPRESSION: HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (Christian Davenport ed., 2000); Christian
Davenport & David. A. Armstrong II, Democracy and the Violation of Human
Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996, 48 AM. J. POL. SCi. 538 (2004);
Ronald A. Francisco, The Relationship Between Coercion and Protest: An Empirical
Evaluation in Three Coercive States, 39 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 263 (1995); Mark
Lichbach, Protest: Random or Contagious? The Postwar United Kingdom, 11 ARMED
FORCES & SOC'Y 581 (1985); T. .David Mason & Dale A. Krane, The Political
Economy of Death Squads: Towards a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned
2007] 275
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strong confidence about one dynamic in the nexus: challenger
mobilisation always induces some degree of repressive state
response.35 As regards to the other dynamic (impact of
repression on mobilisation), no one picture has emerged:
repression is sometimes effective, sometimes counter-
productive, and sometimes makes little identifiable difference.
Whereas earlier work treated dissent and repression as
uniform phenomena, Lichbach argued that the state's actions
should be assessed in terms of both repression and
accommodation; likewise dissenter behaviour should be
analysed in terms of the cost-benefit calculations made by
'dissident entrepreneurs' 36 (protester/rebel leaders) according to
a rational actor model. Dissenters choose tactics (violent or non-
violent), from what Tilly has referred to as the society in
question's "repertoire of collective action."37 If the state
represses non-violent protest, dissenters are likely to switch to
violent tactics (the substitution or adaptation hypothesis).
In line with the adaptation hypothesis, but in an
accelerated form, is Francisco's depiction of 'backlash': which
refers to ".. .massive, rapid, and accelerating mobilisation in the
wake of harsh repression."38 'Harsh repression' (which fits
within this article's notion of legal grey zone activities) includes
such events as "massacres. . .all involving the one-sided and
overwhelming use of state force."39 Empirical support for
recognising the backlash phenomenon came in Khawaja's study
of the West Bank;40 a study in apartheid-era South Africa
displayed a similar pattern.41
LAW AS POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY
Most discussion of law's role by social movement theorists
Terror, 33 INT'L STUD. Q. 175 (1989).
35. Davenport et al, supra note 27, xvi.
36. Mark I. Lichbach, Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate
Studies of Repression and Dissent, 31 Journal of Conflict Resolution 266, 272 (1987).
37. CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILISATION TO REVOLUTION 39 (1978).
38. Ronald A. Francisco, The Dictator's Dilemma, in C. Davenport et al, supra
note 59.
39. Id.
40. Marwan Khawaja, Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from
the West Bank, 8 Soc. F. 47 (1993), and Marwan Khawaja, Resource Mobilization,
Hardship, and Popular Collective Action in the West Bank, 73 Soc. F. 191 (1994).
41. Johan Olivier, State Repression and Collective Action in South Africa,
1970-84, 22 S. AFR. J. SOC. 109 (1991).
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has been located (often implicitly) under 'political opportunity.'
All are agreed on law's repressive potential: in some situations
law can be employed to repress challengers, thereby closing
political opportunity. As regards law-based openings in political
opportunity, most commentators have focused on litigation.
Building on earlier contributions, McCann advanced a concept
of 'legal mobilization,' critiquing court-centred 'top-down'
analysis of law's role in social conflict in which "[c]ausality is
presumed to initiate at the top in a discrete judicial source, and
trickles down unidirectionally on society, if at all."42 As an
alternative he offered a 'decentred' view of law which take social
struggles between non-judicial actors as the focus of analysis;
such actors "are viewed as practical legal agents rather than as
simply reactors to judicial command."43 Actual direct judicial
commands are rare, and are in any case likely to reflect law's
hegemonic quality; more important for decentred views of law
are the 'knowledge and signals' sent out by the court and
assessed by non-judicial actors (i.e. messaging). These indirect
effects contribute to participants' tactical judgments about
practical action in social conflict.
Rather than internalising a 'myth of rights,' activists in
McCann's analysis of the pay equity movement in the United
States are portrayed as employing hard-nosed calculation
focusing on law's instrumental benefits in advancing particular
demands. Given that McCann's analysis proceeds from
assumptions of law's hegemonic quality, how is it possible to
account for law's capacity sometimes to act- against the interests
of the dominant group? His solution is to present judicially
articulated legal norms as having a capacity to "take [on] a life
of their own"4 4 in the hands of activists who may be deeply
critical of the courts and of law-makers. This view meshes well
with Abel's view of apartheid-era law as having a relatively
autonomous quality (a discussion that Abel also cross-references
to the social movement-influenced legal literature).
The social context in which Abel situates his discussion can
be considered the classic 'grey zone' of the state of exception. 45
42. Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
715, 731 (1992).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 733.
45. Abel, supra note 14, at 539. "Loose coupling between top and bottom-the
co-existence of rare conspicuous legalism with pervasive covert illegality-are
universal, but South Africa refined this moral division of labor into a high art." Id.
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Law has the potential to close political opportunity, and political
opportunity may also be closed by illegal state action, but law's
relative autonomy means both that closure by law is not
automatic, and that law offers the remote possibility of
challenging closure. Law may be a shield: trials of dissidents
can provide a platform for challenging closing. Law can also be a
sword: proactive litigation strategies present dissidents with
sites of contestation of their choosing (although with lower
prospects of success).
McCann's and Abel's analyses focus on claims-making in
domestic law. For a variety of reasons, the international arena
has provided increasing sites for challenge in recent decades:
the growth of international law, particularly of international
human rights, international criminal law, and international
trade law; 46 this law's claims to universality; the re-emergence
of the international criminal prosecution model, and the growth
of universal criminal jurisdiction. Some such invocation of
international law may be by grassroots campaigning
organisations in sites of social conflict (who may simultaneously
invoke and critique the law). It may also be by outside entities
(such as states, IGOs or international NGOs), all of which can
operate to alter the terrain within which localised claims-
making occurs.
LAW AS RESOURCE: MOBILISING STRUCTURES
In addition to its facilitative quality, McCann posits a
'constitutive' power for law. 47 Legal claim-making is presented
not simply as a tool permitting or facilitating mobilised groups,
but as a 'resource' which helps to create mobilisation 48 For
McCann, court cases were used by campaigners "to 'hot wire'
movement building campaigns at the grassroots,"49 bringing in
personnel and financial resources. The results of appellate
decisions were 'manipulated' 50 to generate publicity, while local
46. BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW:
DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).
47. Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's "Allurements": A
Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261,
264 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
48. Id.




lawsuits were used as "primary organizing tools by unions and
feminist groups."51 The dynamic being presented is one familiar
in social movement theory in which movement 'entrepreneurs'
employ or manipulate a resource to build social movement
organisations.
The kind of legal resource that McCann focuses upon is
litigation, but implicit in Abel's analysis is the possibility that
law-based repression may, in certain circumstances, contribute
to the mobilisation of the state's challengers. Trials of dissidents
can occupy a paradoxical position in that the controversy they
generate can operate as a brake on repression. Such
proceedings may amount to 'show trials' 52 and so stimulate
challengers. The most pronounced example is where challengers
deliberately invite prosecution with a view to using the
resulting trials as mobilising devices, a tactic that was used in
South Africa, and with even greater effect elsewhere. 53
So far the focus has been on trial as a resource for the
state's challengers. But if trial-based repression can be
considered a resource, or a provider of resources, a similar
categorisation may be appropriate for other categories of
repression. Such repression may be lawful or otherwise,
although the pronounced legal grey zone phenomenon in states
of emergency means that this distinction may be difficult to
draw with precision.
This 'grey zone' effect is directly linked to the structure of
anti-terrorist/emergency powers (though other factors identified
earlier also come into play). These powers tend to be 'executive-
oriented,' 'catch-all' (widely drafted) and 'judge-proof.'54
Emergency and anti-terrorist law tends to invest lower-echelon
police and military operatives with considerable discretionary
powers (for instance to search houses or to stop and search
individuals). These powers may be used with discrimination, or
indiscriminately and abusively, but their structure means that
distinctions may be difficult to draw. Some repression may be
devoid of any legal veneer, and may also be either discriminate
or indiscriminate, but particularly if it involves covert activity,
51. Id.
52. ABEL, supra note 14, at 528.
53. See JUDITH M. BROWN, GANDHI AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THE MAHATMA IN
INDIAN POLITICS 1928-34 (1977).
54. See COLM CAMPBELL, EMERGENY LAW IN IRELAND, 1918-25 (1994); DAVID
BONNER, EMERGENCY POWERS IN PEACETIME (1985).
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accountability in legal grey zones may be impossible to achieve.
As developed by McCann, 'legal mobilisation' provides a
viable account of how demands for legal redress can contribute
to building campaigning movements. But there are two
additional ways in which contemporary social movement theory
implies that law may be a factor in the growth of protest
movements (whether violent or otherwise): where the state's
exercise of a legal power contributes to challenger mobilisation,
or where mobilisation is stimulated when the state acts
illegally. In the state with an ideological commitment to the rule
of law, law is implicated in both instances-by its presence or by
its absence. To address this gap, this article hypothesises a
process of 'legally implicated mobilization,' a concept
encompassing but broader than legal mobilisation. Legally
implicated mobilisation refers to mobilisation of the state's
challengers that is stimulated (a) by the exercise of a legal
power by state operatives, or (b) by illegal action by such
operatives, or (c) where the operatives act in legal grey zones of
ambiguous legality, or (d) by legal claim-making by challenger
organisations. Again, Abel's analysis of the old South Africa
chimes with such an understanding when he suggests that
"[i] ndiscriminate state violence transformed the stigma of
arrest, detention, and punishment into badges of honor"55
generating increased mobilisation: "[t]his experience
educated cadres and intensified their commitment."56
This hypothesis is tested and grounded by reference to the
empirical data below, and characteristics of such mobilisation
(potentially affecting legal 'damping' and 'messaging') explored.
Given Lichbach's insistence on the need to disaggregate state
behaviour in the repression-mobilisation nexus, and Abel's
emphasis on 'indiscriminate' state action in this context, the
question of discrimination in repressive techniques is also
explored.
LAW AND FRAMING PROCESSES
Abel's 'badge of honor' points not only to consideration of
repression as a possible provider of resources to challengers, but
also to an examination of law's place in the framing processes
they employ. The question is related to that of legal 'messaging.'




McCann's focus was on the role of courts in sending 'signals' to
activists about the law, but in the self-defined 'rule of law' state
there is no need to view the state's senders of signals only in
terms of the courts: the behaviour of all state agents sends
signals about the law.
How challengers read these signals is mediated by their
framing processes, which in turn may affect the signals that the
challengers send. For example: a 'rule of law' state engaging in
severe repression (which may be largely illegal), may send a
signal to its challengers that legal restrictions on the state's
behaviour are being set aside ('the gloves are off'). By contrast,
in the authoritarian state ('regimes of ordinary repression'),57
the 'gloves' may be absent all the time; an increase to severe
repression may appear more as incremental change than as a
qualitative shift, with the result that the signalling process may
be quite different. In the 'rule of law' state, challengers in turn
may attempt to construct an ideological device rationalising
their use of violence ('motivational framing' in the social
movement literature),58 based partly on the state's legal failings.
Any such ideological device is likely to be influenced by the
culture of the broader segment of society from which challengers
draw support, which in turn is likely to be influenced by the
state's behaviour. Framing processes inevitably involve agency,
and as the literature in the field identifies, the effectiveness of
the frames created is likely to depend on their salience: "[a]re
movement framings congruent or resonant with the personal,
everyday experiences of the targets of mobilization?"59 This also
has implications for strategies of de-escalation: where a state
shifts from severe illegal repression to lower levels of law-based
repression, this may send a signal that the 'gloves are on,'
affecting societal perceptions of challengers' use of violence (and
their associated framing processes).
57. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of
Recent Developments Concerning Situations Known as States of Siege or
Emergency, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15 (July 27, 1982) (Special Rapporteur
Mrs. N. Questiaux).
58. See, e.g., Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and
Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 617 (2000).
59. Id. at 621.
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2. THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE-STUDY
The legal tools employed by the state in the Northern
Ireland conflict have been explored at length elsewhere. 60
Various statutory powers existed in the Civil Authorities
(Special Powers) Acts 61 (SPA) (repealed in 1973), the Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts (EPA) (from 1973
onwards), and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Acts (PTA) (from 1974 onwards). The latter provided
the template for the centre-piece of current British domestic
anti-terrorist legislation, the Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended).
Statutory provisions were supplemented by ambiguous and
sometimes extensive common law powers, particularly in
relation to the use of force. There have been excellent
quantitative legal studies on the operation of these tools, 62 and
on the experience of ex-prisoners, 63  and well-developed
comparative quantitative (non law-based) studies on state
repression.64  As regards qualitative research, Burton 65,
Cavanaugh, 66 and White67 have conducted pioneering research
relating to experiences of repression from political science and
sociological perspectives. But there is as yet no qualitative
exploration of law's impact on the mobilisation of the state's
60. See, e.g., GERARD HOGAN & CLIVE WALKER, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE
LAW IN IRELAND (1989); Tom Hadden, Kevin Boyle & Colm Campbell, Emergency
Law in Northern Ireland: The Context, in JUSTICE UNDER FIRE (Anthony Jennings
ed., 1st ed. 1988).
61. CAMPBELL, supra note 54, at 277-78.
62. See, e.g., KEVIN BOYLE, TOM HADDEN & PADDY HILLYARD, TEN YEARS ON IN
NORTHERN IRELAND: THE LEGAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1980); DERMOT
WALSH, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND
(1983). For a qualitative study in Britain's Irish community, see PADDY HILLYARD,
SUSPECT COMMUNITY: PEOPLE'S EXPERIENCE OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM
ACTS (1993).
63. See, e.g., Kieran McEvoy, Peter Shirlow & Karen McElrath, Resistance,
Transition and Exclusion: Politically Motivated Ex-Prisoners and Conflict
Transformation in Northern Ireland, 16 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 646 (2004).
64. See, e.g., Ronald A. Francisco, Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in
Two Democratic States 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1179 (1996); George Tsebelis and John
Sprague, Coercion and Revolution: Variations on a Predator-Prey Model, 12
MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING 547 (1989).
65. See FRANK BURTON, THE POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY: STRUGGLES IN A
BELFAST COMMUNITY (1978).
66. See Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Interpretations of Political Violence in
Ethnically Divided Societies, 9 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 33 (1997).
67. See Robert W. White, Issues in the Study of Political Violence:
Understanding the Motives of Participants in Small Group Political Violence, 12




PROFILE OF RESPONDENT GROUP
To address this gap, the respondent group selected for this
article consisted of activists incarcerated for IRA-linked
activities, identified through ex-prisoner organisation Coiste na
nIarchimi,68 all of whom had been released early through the
peace process. Semi-structured interviews were recorded,
transcribed, and analysed using the QSR Nud*ist data analysis
system.
During questioning it became clear that several
respondents had occupied leadership positions in prison, and
that some had been involved in extensive activism. What
emerged was a group incorporating a slice of IRA 'middle-
management'-Lichbach's 'dissident entrepreneurs.'6 9  This
enhanced the utility of the study; the meso-level is the least
researched element of violent republicanism, and its role
potentially offered key insights into the mobilisation process.
There were 16 respondents in total: three female and 13 male.
Six came from rural areas and ten from urban districts.
Respondents' ages ranged from 31 to 58 years. Dominant social
backgrounds were working class and lower middle class.
Educational attainment was high: a number of respondents had
university degrees (several obtained in prison), some at the
master's and doctoral levels.
Flowing from the analytical framework developed above,
this part focuses on three questions: (1) to what extent did
respondents link experience of repression to mobilisation? If
they did, which kinds of repression were involved, and to what
extent was law implicated? (2) What role did law and experience
of repression play in the framing processes evinced by the
activists? (3) What evidence was there of a 'damping effect' for
law, and if evidence were available, how did this effect come
about?
When asked about personal experiences and possible impact
of security force activity on their behaviour, group members
reported memories from pre-teenage years, through to the
arrests that led to their trial. Most accounts fell into three
68. For lists of the organisation's publications and those of its associated
groups see http://www.coiste.ie/publications.htm.
69. Lichbach, supra note 36.
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categories: (1) personal experiences of activities such as house
searches from childhood onwards; (2) experiences in the
interrogation room; and (3) the impact of perceptions of
repressive techniques on a group with whom the respondent
identified. The latter related to two discrete sets of events which
appear to have operated as 'tipping factors', directly propelling
respondents into activism.
EARLY EXPERIENCES OF REPRESSION
Several of the behaviours described in the first group
corresponded with that reported in other studies of security
force (particularly Army) behaviour in the 1970s and 1980s:
typical 'grey zone' activities, where statutory powers were used
in a way that shaded into illegality. One was of 'house raids'-
generally referring to Army searches (based on EPA 1973,70 or
on SPA71) of their parents' homes in the early 1970s. These
operations were typically described as happening in the early
hours of the morning, involving the searching of anything from
one-third to an entire row of houses. Respondents' accounts
were mixed: some described searches executed with clinical
efficiency, but the dominant narrative was couched in the
language of violent intrusion. Accounts tended to emphasise the
humiliation of the older generation, with male respondents in
particular, emphasising the treatment of the mother: ". . . you
know the Army coming with sledgehammers, and heard them
upstairs... and the daughters all round me Ma to put a blanket
up so my Ma could change - she had a nightie and they were
pulling it away 'you f.. .ing Irish bitch get out of the bed.' 72
Another set of early experiences related to the use of stop-
and-search powers (again based on EPA or SPA),73 the picture
emerging being similar to that reported by McVeigh.74
Respondents described feelings of harassment through
continuous operation of these powers-perhaps six stops in one
evening-beginning when they reached the ages of 11-14. Males
tended to describe the Army's behaviour in terms of classic male
70. Emergency Powers Act, 1973 (Act No. 53/1973) (N. Ir.).
71. Civil Auth. (Special Powers) Act (N. Ir.), 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5. c. 4 (N. Ir.).
72. Interview with urban male, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Jan. 2003).
73. N. Ir. (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, § 16; Civil Auth. (Special
Powers) Act (N. Ir.), 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5. c. 6 (N. Ir.).
74. ROBBIE MCVEIGH "IT'S PART OF LIFE HERE...": THE SECURITY FORCES AND
HARASSMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1994).
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bullying: ".. .you were getting stopped, you were getting abused,
you were lucky you got away without a slap... depending on the
regiment, you knew you were going to get robbed."75 Females, by
contrast, tended to describe harassment in terms of sexualised
psychological abuse:
I lived in the same street as the school and there was an [Army]
outpost at the corner, so I had to pass this outpost ten times a day...
and there was always a Brit in it and you would never pass it without
an abusive comment. All this vulgar stuff and that just happened all
the time.
76
Female accounts of contentious street interactions with the
Army in later life tended to emphasise the impact of such
interactions on their children. This offered a partial contrast
with male accounts in general, which tended to emphasise the
impact of Army behaviour on the older generation.
The emphasis by male (rather than female) respondents on
the impact of intrusion on the home might appear to run
contrary to a stream of feminist analyses that emphasises the
significance of the public/private divide. Within this framework,
the public space/home dichotomy is a specific manifestation of
this divide, with the private sphere being an especially
important site of the infliction of harm (generally invisible) on
females, and the public being the site where males suffer (much
more visible) harm by other males. 77
There are two reasons for suggesting that this theoretical
clash may be more apparent than real: the first is that such
limited research as is available in relation to females engaging
in political violence suggests that they tend, more than males, to
reject projections of themselves as 'victims.' Instead females
tend to insist on their own agency (perhaps as a consequence of
having to assert themselves in male-dominated groups, and to
counter gendered-expectations of female activism).78 Some
75. Interview with urban male, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Jan. 2003).
76. Interview with urban female, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Nov. 2002).
77. For a review of the literature on the question of the importance of the
public/provide divide in analyses of the gendered aspects of violently conflicted
societies, see Fionnuala Ni Aoldin & Catherine Turner, Gender, Truth and
Transition, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. (forthcoming 2007). See also Nthabiseng
Motsemme, The Mute Always Speak: On Women's Silences at the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 52 CURRENT SOC. 909 (2004); see also generally ALLAN
FELDMAN, FORMATIONS OF VIOLENCE: THE NARRATIVE OF THE BODY AND POLITICAL
TERROR IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1991).
78. See Alison, supra note 9.
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support for this view emerged in female accounts of
interrogations (below). On this understanding, female activists
might be expected to de-emphasise the impact of harm within
the home, precisely because the home was a key site of general
female victimhood.7 9 The second reason for questioning a
theoretical clash is that, as noted above, in male accounts of
home intrusion, harm tended to be articulated by reference to
female family members; for males, the issue was both a
vicarious experience of female harm, and personal helplessness
in its presence.
More generally, in respondent accounts, initial positive
communal perceptions of the British Army changed from "..
.the British Army's all fantastic guys and they're all down
making them tea and running for Mars bars for the British
soldiers for them to protect the Catholics. . .," to: ". . .next thing
the resentment. Whole streets getting raided .... Kicked the
door down half four in the morning."80 For some, experience of
repression of this sort was directly linked with later violent
involvement: ". . .all them conditions kind of made you into this
f--g terrorist, and people say why? We didn't pop out of the
trees."8 ' The quote referred to repression having a 'kind of
impact, rather than operating as a simple cause-and-effect;
other factors are implicitly projected as coming into play.
The most striking feature that emerges from this picture of
repression is its indiscriminate quality: there is no suggestion of
there being any selectivity, beyond members of the target group
being at least 11 years old and living in nationalist working
class areas. Reflecting this, the interviews frame perceptions of
harassment in a narrative of collective experience: that of the
peer group, family, or of broader sections of society: ". . .there
was just hostility between my community and the British
Army."82
The final set of 'early memories' related to a less researched
area: forced house movement in urban areas as a result of
violence early in the conflict. Some reported the destruction of
family homes, while other described pre-emptive moves in
response to fears of attack. In recent years, the question of
forced population movement in violent ethnically driven
79. We are grateful to Fionnuala Ni Aolgin for this insight.
80. Interview with urban male, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Jan. 2003).
81. Interview with urban male, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Jan.2003).
82. Interview with urban female, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Nov. 2002).
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conflicts has developed a vocabulary of its own,83 but this
language did not exist at the eruption of the Northern Ireland
conflict.
Among respondents, the incidence of reported forced
movement was much higher than can have been the case in the
general population, but qualitative studies do not lend
themselves to statistically significant conclusions. Accounts of
direct forced expulsion are redolent of extreme trauma (most
affected respondents were aged 11-14 years at the time). Some
respondents' account of the 'shock' effect focused mainly on the
behaviour of former neighbours (accounts are mixed); for others,
the shock lay in perceptions of security force collusion (where
law was implicitly implicated by its absence): "at. . . thirteen
years of age you see RUC men and Specials [constables] . . .
standing in the middle of a Loyalist crowd while that Loyalist
crowd burns down houses."84 None of the respondents suggested
any direct link between expulsion and violent involvement; in
all cases though, the affected respondents had become involved
in republican activism within four years of displacement, in
most instances, once they reached some point in the 15-16 age
range. The typical pattern appeared to be of initial involvement
in low level activities, sometimes in the IRAs junior wing
('Fianna Eireann'), 'graduating' to high-intensity violent
activism in the IRA proper.
PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF INTERROGATION
Well-documented detainee-abuse claims featured
throughout the Northern Ireland conflict. These appeared to
follow a cyclical pattern of displacement of abuse: publicity in
relation to particular interrogation practices was followed by
human rights pressure for change, leading to fresh safeguards,
which were then partly circumvented, producing new
allegations of abuse, and leading to demands for new
safeguards.
Three main phases can be identified. In the early 1970s,
following the introduction of indefinite internment without trial
under the SPA two sets of allegations surfaced, corresponding
with the debate on 'torture lite' and 'torture heavy' in the 'war
on terror.' The 'torture lite' allegations entailed the use of the
83. See e.g., ANDREW BELL-FAILKOFF, ETHNIC CLEANSING (1996).
84. Interview with urban male, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Jan. 2003).
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'five techniques' of sensory deprivation (hooding, 'white noise',
sleep deprivation, deprivation of food and water, and wall-
standing), condemned by the European Court of Human Rights
as "inhuman or degrading treatment." 5 The 'heavy' allegations
involved claims of, amongst other things, severe beatings and
forced administration of drugs. In the Donnelly case, European
litigation in relation to the latter claims was stymied on the
grounds that toleration of the activities at a sufficiently high
level of command had not been shown to exist:86 toleration "..
.at the middle or lower levels of the chain of command... does
not... necessarily mean that the state concerned has failed to
take the required steps to comply with its substantive
obligations." 7 In the domestic courts though, substantial
damages were awarded to several of the claimants.
Whereas the practices used in the early 1970s were either
admitted (in the case of the 'five techniques'), or tended to leave
prominent marks on the body, the allegations that surfaced in
the centralised interrogation centres in the late 1970s and early
1980s, were not admitted, and seemed calculated to avoid
earlier levels of evident tissue damage. These occurred in an
interrogation regime that permitted seven-day detention
without charge under the PTA, and which, under the EPA,
rendered admissible, confessions that would have been
inadmissible under the ordinary law.8 8 These allegations
included painful manipulation of limbs, partial asphyxiation,
and employment of threats, including threats of rape of female
detainees.8 9 Following pressure from international human rights
85. See Ireland v United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1978);
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE
SECURITY FORCES OF PHYSICAL BRUTALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARISING OUT OF
EVENTS ON THE 9TH AUGUST, 1971, Cmnd. 4832 [hereinafter COMPTON REPORT],
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER
AUTHORISED PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF
TERRORISM, 1972, Cmd. 4901 [hereinafter PARKER REPORT].
86. Donnelly & Others v. UK, App. No. 5577, 5583/73, 4 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 4 (1975).
87. Id. at 85.
88. The ordinary law initially employed a common law test of'voluntariness' in
relation to admissibility. Under the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern
Ireland) Order 1989 the ordinary law was changed to allow for the exclusion of
confessions based on a test of 'oppression'. Police and Crim. Evidence (N. Ir.) Order,
1989, No.1342 (N.I. 12).
89. AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INT'L MISSION TO N. IR. (28 Nov. -
6 DEC. 1977) (A Index: EUR 45/01/78, 1978).
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NGOs 9° and a critical official inquiry,9 1 additional safeguards,
principally the silent video-monitoring (though not recording) of
interrogations, were introduced in 1979.
Subsequently, claims of physical abuse tended to decline
(with some fluctuations), but in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
allegations of psychological abuse mounted. At the end of 1991
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture was
sufficiently concerned that it judged a visit to Northern Ireland
"to be required in the circumstances. 9 2 The ensuing report was
heavily critical, concluding that "persons arrested in Northern
Ireland under the PTA run a significant risk of psychological
forms of ill-treatment. . . ,,93 The Committee later called for the
closure of the main centre, 94 a call acted upon at the end of
1999.
The interviews in our survey were conducted before the Abu
Ghraib prison scandal broke; inevitably that scandal has
focused fresh interest in the question of sexualised abuse,
including trauma to male genitalia, during interrogation.95 For
interrogators, such abuse provide opportunities for inflicting
intense physical pain, but more importantly, for 'breaking' a
suspect, on the basis that sexuality offers a quick route to core
vulnerabilities.
One result has been to force attention on a neglected
90. Id.
91. COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO
POLICE INTERROGATION PROCEDURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1979, Cmnd. 7497
[hereinafter BENNETT REPORT].
92. European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 7, para. 1, signed Nov. 26, 1987, entered
into force Feb. 1, 1989, Doc. No. H(87)4 1987, ETS 126, reprinted in 27 ILM 1152
(1988).
93. REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF THE VISIT TO
NORTHERN IRELAND CARRIED OUT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE
PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT (CPT), para. 110, CPT (1994), available at
http: / / www.cpt.coe.int Idocuments/gbr/ 1994-17-inf-eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2007).
94. REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ON THE VISIT TO
NORTHERN IRELAND CARRIED OUT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE
PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, at para. 119, CPT (2001), available at
http: / /www.cpt.coe.int Idocuments /gbr/2001-06-inf-eng.pdf (last visited Feb.12,
2007) [hereinafter the 2001 CPT REPORT].
95. See Eric S. Carlson, The Hidden Prevalence of Male Sexual Assault During
War: Observations on Blunt Trauma to the Male Genitals, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
16 (2006).
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undercurrent in Northern Ireland: in Donnelly, one of the
detainees described being made to 'bark like a dog', to squat on
all fours, and being subject to a serious sexual assault (a brush
shaft forced into his anal passage), an allegation generally
neglected in the academic literature. 96 Our interviews also
reported a current of sexualised abusive behaviour by the
security forces, surfacing throughout the conflict, in interactions
on the street and in the interrogation room.
One male respondent described a detention in the early
1970s that involved sleep deprivation, being kept in a room with
visually disorientating pegboard, followed by an interrogator's
demand: ". . . 'right, strip him, strip him,' you know, and you'd
stand there naked, and eh squeezing my testicles for a bit, and I
fainted."97 That respondent reported being left with bruising on
his body. Several respondents reported detentions in the late
1970s, which involved some overlapping complaints (including
partial asphyxiation), but which displayed a much greater
emphasis on avoiding bodily marks. Trauma to the male
genitals also figured in accounts from this period:
[Ilt must be a sexual thing you know, or maybe because most of the
people arrested were mainly young fellas, but they used to always
concentrate on your privates you know, that sort of thing; em so they
were very aggressive you know, but also usually they kept their cool.98
Accounts of interrogations in the final period are more
mixed. Several respondents emphasised the 'boring'99 quality of
detentions, at which they refused to answer questions, but
which they did not depict as involving ill-treatment. The
undercurrent of sexualised interrogation practice though,
surfaced again in female accounts: ". . .1 was physically abused
and sort of, in a way, sexually abused. This particular [Special]
Branch man was putting his hands on my body, and putting his
arms round me, and trying to intimidate me that way."100
Another session was described as involving a variant of the good
cop - bad cop routine: ". . .he [the interrogator] would be nice for
a while, and then once he'd changed, then he started to come on
96. See Donnelly Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep., at 15; Compton Report, supra
note 85, 17; JOHN McGUFFIN, THE GUINEAPIGS 69 (1974).
97. Interview with urban male, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Jan. 2003).
98. Interview with urban male, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Mar. 2003).
99. Interview with rural male, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 2002).
100. Interview with urban female, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Nov. 2002).
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sexually, and then he just got physically abusive." 101
Female accounts, though, emphasised resilience in the face
of attempts by interrogators to use such gendered pressure
points as the absence of the (detained) parent: "They said about
being out and raiding the house, and 'we're going to out to raid
you, and all your kids were yelling and screaming you know,'
and I thought 'no I don't think so, my kids are too used to them
you know."' 102
Overall, therefore, accounts of abuse during interrogation
had a temporal dimension consistent with the three phases
outlined above. There was also a gendered dimension, with
females more likely to recount psychological sexualised abusive
behaviour that displayed continuity with gendered experience of
street interactions with the Army. With obvious contemporary
resonance, 'torture lite' and 'torture heavy' appear not as
alternative strategies but as partly contemporaneous and
overlapping phenomena. Unacknowledged 'torture heavy' may
have happened because 'torture lite' was officially sanctioned,
pointing to the importance of messaging within and beyond
state structures, a point explored further below.
MASS MOBILISATION AND VIOLENT MOBILISATION
The key to interpreting the impact of the third set of
experiences lies in the uneven picture of timing of recruitment
of members of the respondent group that emerged in the survey:
there was heavy clustering around two time-periods (1972-3 and
1981-3), with only outliers joining in other years. Heavy IRA
recruitment in 1972-3 is often explained in terms of a reaction to
the 'Bloody Sunday' killings in January 1972, when
paratroopers shot 13 people dead at a protest march, but the
interview data suggests that this may oversimplify the process.
The march was called by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
Association (NICRA) to protest against the introduction of
internment without trial in August 1971. Soon after the first
internment arrests, well-documented accounts of severe
prisoner abuse began to circulate, corresponding with the
'torture lite' and 'torture heavy' accounts described above,
prompting a resurgence of mass mobilisation in street protests.
Of the respondent group, only one person made an
101. Id.
102. Interview with urban female, Belfast, N. Ir. (Feb. 2003).
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automatic link between the Bloody Sunday events and the
decision on violent involvement. Rather, a more nuanced picture
was painted, of personal experience of lower levels of repression;
of identification with the detainees from whom the abuse claims
emanated; and of identification with the cause and the victims
of the Bloody Sunday protest: "it was all those things, one thing
after another and then the next big event after that, Bloody
Sunday." 03
A similarly layered picture emerges in relation to activists
in the 1981-83 cluster; in virtually all cases, the radicalisation
that led to IRA activism coincided with involvement in street
protests on behalf of IRA prisoners participating in the 'dirty
protest' (1977 - 81) and hunger-strikes (1980-81) (ten prisoners
fasted to death) in the Maze Prison ('H-Blocks') (male prisoners)
and in Armagh Jail (female prisoners). The government claimed
that conditions in the jails were self-inflicted, while
campaigners blamed the authorities for the conditions, for
beatings, and for humiliating body searches. The European
Commission, which viewed the prisoners' claims as constituting
a demand for 'political prisoner status' found that no such "...
entitlement in the present context can be derived from existing
norms of international law," though the Commission did
criticize the authorities' 'inflexible' approach.10 4
Respondent accounts paint a picture of personal experience
of repression creating a predisposition to support for violent
anti-state challenge; of identification with protesting prisoners
leading to involvement in mass demonstrations; and of the
Government's handling of prison protest playing a key role in
relation to IRA involvement: the hunger strike ". . .crystallised
my opinions and the decisions that you make, and I joined the
IRA straight after the hunger strike."10 5
While most respondents implicated personal experience of
repression to some extent in their violent involvement, accounts
relating to the two big clusters of IRA recruitment had three
elements in common, separating them from the cases of outliers:
the first is that perceptions of egregious repression directed at a
group with whom the respondents identified appeared to
function as 'tipping factors.' Both clusters involved perceptions
103. Interview with urban male, Belfast, N. Ir. (Jan. 2003).
104. McFeely v U.K., App. No. 8317/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 161, 195 (1980)
(Commission Report).
105. Interview with urban male, Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 2002).
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of prisoner ill-treatment, and multiple deaths for which
respondents blamed the state. Della Porta's research suggested
a similar, though less pronounced dynamic in the radicalisation
of members of German terrorist groups. 10 6
The second is that, particularly in the case of the 1972-73
cluster, and to some extent in the 1981-3 group, the activities
giving rise to these perceptions corresponded with the pattern of
legal grey zones set out earlier: activities of doubtful or heavily
contested compatibility with domestic and/or international law
norms, where the reach of the law was limited.
The third is that both clusters of violent mobilisation were
preceded by largely non-violent mass mobilisation (this bears
some comparison with Della Porta's observation that violent
radicalisation in mainland Europe in the late 1960s and in the
1980s was preceded by in each case by mass mobilisation)07. In
both periods in Northern Ireland, mass mobilisation
corresponded with McCann's notion of 'legal mobilization.' In
the case of NICRA the ending of internment was one of a series
of discrete demands for legal reforms around which mobilisation
had been built. In the 'H-block and Armagh' campaign, the focus
was on five discrete prisoners' demands, such as the right not to
wear prison uniforms-a right easily framed in legal terms, and
ultimately legislated for in a new statutory instrument.08
Violent mobilisation, which involved much smaller numbers of
individuals, fed off the largely peaceful mass mobilisation that
preceded it. This was true of accounts of both male and female
activists.
Lichbach's depiction of the 'entrepreneurship' of rebel
leaders helps to explain this phenomenon. Just as McCann
depicted protest leaders as 'manipulating' the results of
litigation to built protest movements, the picture suggested in
the survey was of rebel leaders manipulating experiences and
perceptions of repression to build their organisation.
Entrepreneurship was evident in the extent to which repression,
aimed at ending challenge to the state, was paradoxically
transformed into a provider of resources (recruits and communal
support/toleration). Indiscriminate state repression appears as a
low-cost benefit to 'violent entrepreneurs,' 0 9 since by definition
106. DELLA PORTA, supra note 29, at 160.
107. Id.
108. The Prison Rules (Northern Ireland) 1982, SR (1982) No. 170, rule 67.
109. DELLA PORTA, supra note 29, at 195-201, uses the phrase 'entrepreneurs of
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it rarely hits activists, and frequently radicalises the population
from which challengers spring; in a formulation attributed to a
senior republican, some security force strategies were "the best
recruiting tools the IRA ever had."110 The manipulation leading
to this mobilisation was able to draw upon a range of individual
motivations, corresponding with the mixed bag described in
several published accounts of IRA involvement."' These
included the excitement of youthful activism, the 'romantic"' 2
appeal of republicanism, and anti-Protestant sectarianism,
particularly in 1970s Belfast, which respondents were keen to
distance themselves from, but which was acknowledged as a
factor motivating some IRA members.
LAW, REPRESSION AND FRAMING PROCESSES
Predictably, the framing processes suggested by members of
the respondent group appeared to be geared towards valorising
the violent mobilisation with which they were associated.
International comparisons abounded (principally with the
ANC). But these processes also suggested some paradoxical
elements, not least in relation to the role of law.
One paradox related to the question of the contribution of
the impact of experience of repression in the formation of
communal identities. This issue is particularly important given
that the 'tipping factors' that emerged in relation to violent
activism, related to not to personal experience, but to
perceptions of egregious repression directed at members of the
community with which respondents identified. Some
respondents linked identification with community with personal
experience of conflict (including that of repression): "I grew up
as a wee Brit... It's only when the conflict came you started
recognising who you are."1 3 This suggests that a process of
individual alignment with movement framing processes
violence' to refer to violent social movement organisations. We employ the title
'violent entrepreneurs' to refer to individual meso-level activists.
110. Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into the Fire: How to Avoid
Getting Burned by the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland,
24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1657, 1662 (2003) (quoting Interview with Jim McVeigh, Long
Kesh, Maze Prison (Dec. 9, 1998)).
111. See EAMON COLLINS, KILLING RAGE (1998); SEAN O'CALLAGHAN, THE
INFORMER (1999).
112. Interview with urban male, Belfast, N. Ir. (Mar. 2003).
113. Interview with urban male, Belfast, N. Ir. (Jan. 2003).
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identifying a clear 'enemy' began at an early age; that
experience of the impact of emergency powers fed into the
adoption and creation of these frames; and that experience of
indiscriminate repression had the effect of increasing the sense
of solidarity of the targeted group.
Another set of paradoxes related to framing around the
question of 'grievances.' In line with contemporary social
movement theory on the relatively static quality of grievances,
the core grievance articulated by respondents was the
traditional one: the illegitimacy of Northern Ireland (rather
than security force activity). Nevertheless, there was a marked
division in the respondent group in how the claimed failings of
the state were framed ('diagnostic framing'),114 which in turn fed
into respondents' rationalisation of violence. One stream
attempted to rationalise the use of violence in terms of the need
to end British sovereignty in Northern Ireland. The more
dominant stream nuanced the issue somewhat, locating resort
to violence in the state's suppression of civil rights protests: "we
had the Civil Rights [Movement]. . . and we had the state
responding violently to those peaceful marches, peaceful
requests."115 From this perspective, violence occurred because of
a failure of non-violent efforts to remedy rights-violations,
raising the question whether securing peaceful change could
contribute to ending violence.
While it is true that NICRA met with a repressive response,
it is not true that the effective end of the movement (c. 1972)
was the end of progressive change. Rather, direct British rule
from 1972 onwards (punctuated by the 1973 power-sharing
experiment) was characterised by a twin-track of repression and
reform in the anti-discrimination field. From the Anglo-Irish
Agreement onwards (1985), this reform process also
encompassed greater official recognition of an Irish identity. The
1985 Agreement represented the encapsulation of this identity
in a treaty binding in international law,116 a model subsequently
followed in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 1998.117
114. Benford & Snow, supra note 58, at 615.
115. Interview with rural male, Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 2002); C.f DELLA PORTA,
supra note 29, at 163 (accounting the articulation of "injustice frames" (quoting
GAMSON ET AL, ENCOUNTERS WITH UNJUST AUTHORITY (1982)).
116. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland, Nov.
15 1985, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 62 (1985), (Cmnd. 9690).
117. The 1998 Agreement contained both an international treaty between the
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The respondent retort to this was partly to appropriate the
reform achievements as the result of the use of violence: ". . .if it
hadn't been for armed struggle I don't believe that there would
have been an acceptance on the part of the British to actually
force the Unionists to accept anti-discrimination legislation."118
In a similar vein, respondents sought to claim the new political
dispensation in Northern Ireland (including the Belfast/Good
Friday Agreement and increasing legal recognition of an Irish
identity), as at least partly their achievement, reflected in one
respondent's assertion of a widespread belief that
[W]ithout people that had took part in the armed struggle... we would
not be at the juncture we are at today. You know people would say 'yes
we agree, we may not have agreed with your em methods, but it was
without doubt that the IRA has created conditions, has eh brought this
on.119
This implicit valorisation of law as a vehicle for capturing
political gain sits uneasily with the Marxist-influenced analyses
provided by some respondents; this demands a re-examination
of the position of law in framing processes of violent challengers,
beyond a focus either on 'law as repression' or the mobilising
effects of legal claims-making. Clearly, respondents did not
manifest adherence to Scheingold's 'myth of rights.' Their
ideological constructs tended both to incorporate and to go
beyond the calculus described by McCann, where pay-equity
activists are seen as assessing claim-making in instrumental
terms.
Another body of American qualitative work on
individualised 'legal consciousness' and on cultural approaches
to law and social change presents a more varied picture of law's
framing in social conflict, offering additional insights into
attitudes of members of the respondent group.1 20 Ewick and
Silbey demonstrated how one individual can simultaneously
display a consciousness of law that is 'multiple and
UK and Ireland, and a political agreement involving Northern Ireland's political
parties. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, 37 ILM
751. See Colim Campbell, Fionnuala Ni Aoldin & Colin Harvey, The Frontiers of
Legal Analysis: Re-Framing the Transition in Northern Ireland 66 MOD. L. REV. 317
(2003).
118. Interview with urban male, Belfast, N. Ir. (Mar. 2003).
119. Interview with rural male, Belfast, N. Ir. (Feb. 2003).
120. Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation and Resistance:
An Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992).
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contingent', 121  simultaneously conforming and resistant.
Similarly, Kostiner's qualitative work on attitudes of social
justice activist to law's role in social change suggests that
individually and collectively the activists displayed not one
coherent frame of reference in assessing law's role, but multiple
'schemas' (a concept related to frames),122 depending on whether
law was being assessed in instrumental, political or cultural
terms. 123 Culturally, respondent accounts in the Northern
Ireland survey tended to project a view of law as a tool of
oppressive authority; in instrumental terms, legal claims-
making tended to be implicitly validated; and politically, law
tended to be viewed ambivalently as potentially capturing or
obstructing, political gain. The accounts also suggested some
trans-national legal 'frame diffusion.124 The emphasis on claims-
making by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, was
explicitly referenced to the experience of the Civil Rights
Movement in the US, and by their constant mention of the ANC,
respondents were invoking the example of a movement that took
a highly legalised approach to post-conflict transformation.
Substantively, respondent accounts invite the rejoinder that
much or all of Northern Ireland's equality reform may have
happened anyway; if so, any additional 'gains' were limited to
the official recognition of an 'Irish dimension.' Furthermore,
even if the initiation of .the overall changes process owed
something to the combination of civil rights campaigns and
armed rebellion in the 1970s, by the end of the decade violence
may have become dysfunctional as a vehicle for change. It is
impossible to prove this argument one way or the other, but
presentation of a key rationale for the IRA's activities as being
the achievement of progressive political change, at least some of
which could be captured as law, is at odds with the apparent
ideological underpinning of violent republicanism. One
possibility is that the real goals were always more flexible. A
second possibility is that the shift in emphasis can be explained
in terms of the failure of the IRA to achieve its core goals, and
the consequent need to find alternative gains to represent the
121. Id. at 747.
122. See Benford & Snow, supra note 58, at 614, n.3 (describing the relationship
between "schemata" and "frames").
123. Idit Kostiner, Evaluating Legality: Towards a Cultural Approach to the
Study of Law and Social Change, 37 LAW & SOCY REV. 323 (2003).
124. Benford and Snow, supra note 58, at 627.
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achievements of 'armed struggle'. A third possibility is that
while the original goals of the movement were monolithic, shifts
on a sliding scale occurred during the course of the conflict.
Most came about because of the successful entry of the IRA's
political allies, Sinn Fain,125 into electoral politics. But some
shifts may have come about partly as a result of successes
achieved by activists in utilising law as a vehicle for political
contestation, thereby opening political opportunities in a way
that buttressed the move into electoral politics. Several
respondents reported having undertaken successful legal claims
to obtain compensation for abuse of emergency powers.
Respondents also emphasised the successes of post hunger-
strike campaigns by prisoners, which as other studies have
illustrated were partly dependent on the creative use of judicial
review mechanisms. 126
A final point to emerge about the framing processes evident
in the survey was their exclusionary dimension. While there
was a heavy emphasis on the substance and the mobilising
effects of state repression on nationalist communities, few
respondents demonstrated much awareness of possible
mobilising effects of republican violence on loyalist
communities, nor did male respondents articulate much regret
for IRA victims (females were more likely to). While the position
was not uniform, 'regret' tended to relate to the death of
civilians resulting from 'silly and stupid mistakes'1 27 But the
IRA's systematic breaches of international standards applicable
in violent conflict cannot be dismissed as 'mistakes.' While the
pattern of fatalities inflicted by the organisation displayed an
emphasis on security force personnel, 128 there appear to have
been at least three areas of IRA activity that entailed systematic
violations of 'laws of war' standards: the infliction of
'punishment' shootings and beatings of individuals accused of
'anti social activities'; the use of bombs against commercial
premises even if warnings were given; and the ill-treatment of
125. See RICHARD ENGLISH, ARMED STRUGGLE: A HISTORY OF THE IRA (2003);
BRIAN FEENEY & SINN FEIN: A HUNDRED TURBULENT YEARS (2002).
126. KIERAN McEvoY, PARAMILITARY IMPRISONMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
RESISTANCE MANAGEMENT, AND RELEASE (2001).
127. Interview with urban male, Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 2002).
128. DAVID McKITTRICK ET AL, LOST LIVES: THE STORIES OF THE MEN, WOMEN
AND CHILDREN WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND TROUBLES, 1536




suspected informers. The rights-violations that figured in
respondent accounts were those that had instrumental value to
the movement's political goals; others seemed generally
invisible.
LAW AND 'DAMPING'
Tilly's depictions of the mechanisms of the democratic state
as having a 'damping' effect on conflict begs the question of law's
possible contribution. At first sight, Northern Ireland might
seem to contradict his claim: despite being part of a democratic
state, the region saw intense violence and repression in the
early 1970s. But in the 1980s and 1990s both the violence and
the repression had decreased significantly. This cannot be
explained simply in terms of incapacity to inflict damage: when
the IRA eventually destroyed the remainder of its weaponry in
2005, the stockpile is estimated to have included over two
tonnes of Semtex, one thousand firearms (including heavy
machine guns), and a number of surface-to-air missiles.129 The
state likewise, retained a repressive potential that was much
greater than that deployed. There must therefore have been
some forces at work constricting the behaviour of both the state
and its challengers.
If these challengers are viewed simply as deracinated
entities, it is difficult to see how such forces could have
operated. Crenshaw's close reading of the relevant psychological
literature rejects such an approach, leading her to conclude that
research '. . should continue to be based on a model that
integrates the individual, the group and society. "Terrorists"
cannot be considered in isolation from their social and political
context'. 130  Respondent accounts supported Crenshaw's
contention, displaying heavy emphases on association with
community and on group identity, suggesting at times some
merging of individual consciousness: "we didn't carry any
129. IRA Has Destroyed All Its Arms, BBC News UK Edition, September 26,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/northernireland/4283444.stm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2007).
130. Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 418. Crenshaw is dismissive of
psychopathological explanations of terrorism; data from Northern Ireland supports
her position: R. Elliot and William H. Lockhart, Characteristics of Scheduled
Offenders and Juvenile Delinquents, in CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND, (Jeremy Harbison & Joan Harbison eds., 1980).
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baggage with us... We don't carry any regrets."131
The accounts also project a sense of an organisation
generated by a particular set of historical circumstances, but
later taking on something of a life of its own: "In 72 it was not a
secret army... everybody in the district knew who was in the
IRA."' 32 The resulting security force penetration explains the
IRA's partial switch in the mid-1970s to a cell structure, one
result being that activists: "became more and more divorced
from the people as they tried to protect themselves from the
community 'cos they were worried about [informers]. "133 The
accounts also suggest that around this time, the IRA's base of
active support narrowed considerably. This appears to have left
the organisation heavily dependent on a relatively narrow base
(the views of which it needed to heed), while also able to count
on degrees of toleration in some communities.
Moxon-Browne makes a similar point to Crenshaw when he
speaks of Irish republican 'fish' swimming in a fluctuating 'sea'
of communal toleration and support.134 In respondent accounts
this tide clearly ebbs and flows. It is presented at having been at
its highest when repression was at its harshest, and as declining
when repression wound down:
If the Brits were chasing you or you could run into anybody's house
and you knew that they would protect you... that's the way it was in
1972. I went into jail in January 1973 and whenever I came out [1976]
I noticed that there was a big change... there would have been a lot
less of them prepared to allow you to use their houses. 13
5
In respondent accounts the tide rose again in the early 1980s
following the second round of mass mobilisation associated with
prison protests:
[You had phenomenal support, it was almost like an Intifada.
That's what it was like, like the seventies re-run you know. You had
literally everybody out, there wasn't a door that wasn't open to you in
terms of, you know, in and out of houses, people assisting the IRA.
136
What emerges from these accounts is an impression of
131. Interview with rural female (Feb. 2003).
132. Interview with urban male in Belfast, N. Ir. (Nov. 2002).
133. Interview with urban male in Belfast, N. Ir. (Mar. 2003).
134. Edward Moxon-Browne, The Water and the Fish: Public Opinion and the
Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, in BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 41,
68-69 (Paul Wilkinson ed., 1981).
135. Interview with urban male in Belfast, N. Ir. (Nov. 2002).
136. Interview with urban male in Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 2002).
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complex reciprocity and messaging, supporting Darby's
contention that the Northern Ireland conflict had some unstated
'rules.' 137 Respondent accounts suggest that this was not a
simple two-way interaction; rather it was at least three-way
(state, challengers and affected community). Interactions seem
to involve a complex semaphore, affecting not only degrees of
violence, but also levels of cruelty. Most indiscriminate
republican violence was bunched in the 1970s when repression
was at a high level. Respondent accounts suggest a picture of
communal toleration for IRA activities increasing when
repression was at its most indiscriminate, and decreasing either
when repression became less indiscriminate and less egregious,
or when the IRA employed indiscriminate violence: ". . .a big
difference in Vietnam... was the Vietnamese were prepared to
suffer an awful lot more than Nationalist people were prepared
to."138 From this perspective, limiting factors on republican
violence depended only partly on moral repugnance by
challengers to the use of indiscriminate violence, but also on
self-interest by 'violent entrepreneurs' who realised that
unlimited violence would erode a relatively narrow support base
upon which they were heavily dependant.
To return to the question of messaging, the interview data
suggest that this debate needs to be widened beyond the current
focus in anti-terrorist legal discourse on messaging within the
state apparatus, 139 to include a broader category of 'legally
implicated messaging' to a variety of constituencies arising from
legal grey zone activities. This includes the messages that the
state sends to targeted communities when it engages in
indiscriminate or egregious repression, and that sent by
elements in these communities to the state's challengers. This
supports the earlier contention that messaging in the 'rule of
law' state (where harsh repression is exceptional), is different
from that in the authoritarian entity (where it may be the
norm).
As regards the damping effects of law, a clear distinction
can be identified between the earlier and later phases of the
conflict. In the early years, the shock effect of the outbreak of
137. JOHN DARBY, INTIMIDATION AND THE CONTROL OF NORTHERN IRELAND 168-
169 (1986).
138. Interview with urban male in Belfast, N. Ir. (Mar. 2003).
139. See Oren Gross, The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the Law, in
TORTURE: A COLLECTION, 229, 245-46 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
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violence, coupled with constitutional divisions and uncertainty
over common-law powers, created a legal position of
considerable laxity, facilitating the emergence of significant grey
zones.140 Later, as official inquiries mounted,141 and legal norms
began to 'bite' more effectively, visible repression came to
approximate more closely to formal rationality (although the
powers remained highly abrasive), and illegal repression
became associated with covert operations, where state
involvement was largely invisible (the clearest example being
collusion between element in the security forces and loyalist
paramilitaries).142
At that point, however, a dynamic of mobilisation had
already been created in which earlier 'harsh' and often illegal
repression had had a critical, long-term impact. As regards the
visible, law-based repression that followed in the late 1970s,
respondent accounts of street harassment and of arrest and
detention have a 'cat and mouse' quality about them. This
repression, particularly when indiscriminate in operation,
appears to have helped to sustain a degree of mobilisation,
though at a declining level from the early 1970s. The effect of
the second round of mobilisation, corresponding with the H-
Block protest, was partly to reverse this decline from the mid-
1980s, and thereafter something of a plateau was reached,
whereby repression and mobilisation seem to have sustained
each other. This suggests a dynamic in the violently conflicted
'rule of law' state whereby, at the outset of conflict, law cannot
prevent the state engaging in activities that contribute to
significant challenger mobilisation, but the state, having
contributed to this generation, struggles to eliminate violent
opposition. While it is important to recognise this element of
law-as-limitation on the liberal state, it is also important to
include other factors (including media attention and public
140. See supra Part 1.
141. E.g., NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY
INTO POLICE INTERROGATION PROCEDURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1979, Cmnd.
7497.
142. For a case-study on covert repression, see JUSTIN O'BRIEN, KILLING
FINUCANE: MURDER IN DEFENCE OF THE REALM (2005). See also POLICE OMBUDSMAN
FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, 'STATEMENT BY THE POLICE OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN
IRELAND ON HER INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
DEATH OF RAYMOND MCCORD JUNIOR AND RELATED MATTERS' (2007) (discussing




opinion). Law operates not as a guarantee of legality in a
violently conflicted liberal state, but as a check on the illegality
in which the state can be seen to engage.
3. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis points to law's role in the violently conflicted
liberal state being much more complex and ambiguous than
contemporary anti-terrorist legal discourse suggests. Most
importantly, simplistic models of crisis-response and of
'effectiveness' need to be radically revised to take account of the
extent to which law is implicated in the impact of state action on
challenger mobilisation-of 'legally implicated mobilization.'
Rather than conforming to a model of surgical 'response,' the
relationship between some kinds of repression and violence may
approximate more to one of symbiosis--each feeding off the
other, in a mutually sustaining fashion. Reflecting this, the
legal narratives implicitly and explicitly presented in the
interview data form a complex series of paradoxical
relationships: law as repression; law-based and illegal
repression in legal grey zones as a spur to challenger
mobilisation; law as a vehicle for political contestation; law as
potential political gain; and law as a damping mechanism on
conflict in the liberal state.
The shortcomings of the dominant discourse point to the
need for a reshaping: There is a need for recognition that legal
grey zone activities, typical of the state of exception, such as
prisoner ill-treatment (often sexualised), and abuse of lethal
force, can be particularly implicated in challenger mobilisation.
There needs to be a greater recognition amongst lawyers of the
capacity of the ideology of the rule of law to take on a life of its
own, leaving an ambiguous capacity for legal challenge even in
the grey zone--'anomie' is never likely to be complete. There is a
need for a recognition that the longer a conflict persists, the
greater the pressures for contraction of the grey zone will be.
And there is a need to move beyond a narrow concept of 'legal
messaging' to take account of the messaging that state action
sends between non-state constituencies. The Northern Ireland
data suggests some gendered differences in experience of
repression, but it also suggests that the dominant pattern of
mobilisation (violent activism following involvement in non-
violent mass-mobilisation), is similar for males and females,
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questioning reductive, gender-specific explanations of violent
activism.
This is not to suggest that the analysis developed in this
article can be transferred straightforwardly to Western
experience of the 'war on terror.' Despite the parallels drawn
earlier, there are important differences: the state interest and
international standing as between the United States and the
United Kingdom are different, as is the degree of
internationalisation-indeed globalisation-of the conflict;
patterns of the ratification of international law instruments also
diverge; and there are important differences between
organisations such as the IRA and jihadi terrorist groups.
All of this points to the need for a new research agenda, but
it also offers something of a map whereby sites ripe for further
legal exploration in the 'war on terror' can be identified. This
article concludes therefore with observations under three
headings: legal research on violent jihadi groups; the geographic
dimension of novel claims-making; and the 'damping' effect of
law on conflict.
JIHADI TERRORIST GROUPS: A LEGAL RESEARCH AGENDA
There has been little legal research on jihadi terrorist
groups. Such research as has been published in other disciplines
suggests that some of al-Qaeda's mobilising structures are much
more diffuse than those of the IRA, and its political goals more
diverse; indeed 'al-Qaeda' may well be partly an abstraction,
culled from a variety of violent jihadi entities.143 Other elements
of the Iraqi insurgency may, however, approximate more closely
to the Irish example. In terms of collective action repertoires, al-
Qaeda violence tends to be much more indiscriminate than was
the general pattern in Northern Ireland.144 In addition, al-
Qaeda relies on suicide bombers, and is frequently reported to
be intent on developing weapons of mass destruction (although
actual attacks have been low-tech); neither consideration
applied in Northern Ireland.
The diffuse nature of jihadi mobilising structures may be
143. See, e.g., JASON BURKE, AL-QAEDA: THE TRUE STORY OF RADICAL
ISLAM (2004).
144. For example, the IRA frequently gave advance warning of its attacks on
property in order to avoid civilian casualties, and maintain its support base. For an
American account, see Sarah Lyall, I.R.A Bomb Destroyed in Central London, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1996, at 6 (citing an expert on the IRA).
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contributing to a particularly dangerous dynamic: the
difficulties in combating such mercurial entities may prompt
loosely targeted initiatives where intelligence may be faulty or
non-existent. Pressures for such activities may be particularly
strong in the face of perceived threats from weapons of mass
destruction. Such behaviour could be expected to enhance the
sense of solidarity of affected out-groups, enhancing the capacity
of 'violent entrepreneurs' to manipulate resentments,
particularly where long-standing sense grievances against the
West/North remains pervasive.
If these patterns repeat themselves, allegations of abuse of
detainees in Abu Ghraib, Guant~namo and Basra seem
especially likely to have stimulated challenger mobilisation,
particularly in populations radicalised by indiscriminate use of
exceptional powers. In light of examples from Northern Ireland
and elsewhere, the sexualised nature of the abuse in Abu
Ghraib appears less an aberration than a specific manifestation
of a broader pattern of the employment of sexuality as a weapon
in non-conventional conflicts, as in open warfare.
Allegations of abuse in Guantanamo in particular, appear to
have been facilitated by the existence of a pronounced legal grey
zone, whereby jurisdictional issues were manipulated in an
attempt to limit the reach of domestic and international law. It
follows that contemporary calls for loosening prohibitions on
torture 145  or for redefining 'inhuman and degrading
treatment ' 14 6 seem misplaced, not only on grounds of principle,
but also on pragmatic grounds since their implementation
appears particularly likely to stimulate violent mobilisation.
Execution of prisoners following trial by military commission,
could also be expected to contribute significantly to violent
mobilization, particularly in the case of a series of executions,
producing a compound effect.
At this point there is an absence of the kind of empirical
data required to assess whether this dynamic is manifesting in
any or all or the geographically widely-dispersed sites of the
'war on terror.' There is a need for qualitative and quantitative
research on the impact of varieties of repression by states with a
formal commitment to the 'rule of law' on the mobilisation and
145. Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22,
2002, at A19.
146. Ignatieff in THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF
TERROR in effect presents the argument for such a redefinition. See supra note 2.
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the mobilising structures of jihadi-terrorist groups. What kinds
or conceptions of law figure in the framing processes of these
groups: Divine, domestic, international? Are there any
differences in that regard as between groups whose activists are
born in the West and others? What judgments about law are
implicit in the extensive litigation strategies in which
Guantdnamo detainees are involved? What role may law play in
a variety of conflict-sites in relation to closing or opening of
political opportunities affecting violent and non-violent groups?
If a shift from violent activism to political challenge would
require changes to challenger groups' framing processes,
mobilising structures, and the political opportunity structures
they face, what legal engineering would be likely to promote
such shifts?
THE NOVEL GEOGRAPHY OF CLAIMS-MAKING
Constructing the 'war on terror' as 'global' not only elides a
number of quite diverse conflicts, it also brings under one rubric
a vast range of potential legal claims-making. Four (partly
overlapping) prime sites can be identified: where state actors
are challenged in their own courts; where state actors are
challenged in the domestic legal systems of third countries;
where state actors are challenged within international human
rights framework; and where behaviour is challenged within
regional intergovernmental rights frameworks. Potential
claimants are myriad: claims my be brought by human rights
NGOs on behalf of detainees allegedly involved in terrorism; by
peace-focused social movement organisations; or claims of non-
adherence to legal human rights standards may be articulated
by regional and international monitoring bodies.
Within state actors' own legal systems, a pattern has
emerged of critical decisions by the superior courts in the both
the United States147 and the United Kingdom. 148 This is
consistent with the model explored in part 1 above, suggesting
the persistence of law's relative autonomy during the state of
exception. These partial successes by claims-makers are likely
147. See, e.g., Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 126
S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
148. See e.g., A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department; X and




to stimulate further litigation. Even if much of this proves
ultimately unsuccessful, it seems likely to have significant
effects on the mechanics of the state repression, by virtue of the
delaying effects of successive court challenge.
Within the legal systems of third countries, transnational
patterns are emerging of the use of law both as shield and
sword. As a shield, peace protesters in the Republic of Ireland
successfully defended themselves against a charge of criminal
damage to a US Navy aircraft by invoking a defence that they
were acting to prevent the loss of life and property in Iraq.149 In
a British case involving similar facts, a jury was unable to agree
on the conviction of anti-war activists who claimed that they
acted to prevent the commission of war crimes in Iraq.'50 That
defence had been left open by a House of Lords judgement,
which nevertheless excluded a defence of acting to prevent the
crime of aggression. 151
A further example of the use of law as a shield is the ruling
of the German Federal Administrative Court preventing the
imposition of a sanction on an Army officer who refused, on
conscientious grounds, to follow orders "that were suited to
supporting acts of war in Iraq"; 52 in the officer's view, the war
was "contrary to international law." Germany also provides an
example of the attempted use of law as a sword in the complaint
laid by the Centre for Constitutional Rights against a number of
prominent named American defendants. This seeks to exploit
Germany's universal criminal jurisdiction over torture, to
challenge the legal framework of alleged US ill-treatment of
detainees in the 'war on terror.'1 53 Pointedly, the complaint has
invoked the precedent of the Nuremberg 'judges trial,'"1 54 while
recognising the very different scale of Nazi atrocity.
At the international level, neither the United States nor the
149. See Not Guilty Verdict in Third Trial of Anti-War Activists, IRISH TIMES,
July 26, 2006, at 4.
150. See Clare Dyer, Freed Activists Accused of US Bomb Carrier Damage Face
Retrial, GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2006, at 7.
151. R v Jones and others [2006] UKHL 16, [2006] All ER 741.
152. 2nd Wehrdienstsenat des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerwG] [Military
Service Division of the German Federal Administrative Court June 21, 2005,
BVerwG 2 WD 12.04 (5), available at http://www.lcnp.org/global/
Germanrefusercase.pdf.
153. Complaint Lodged with the German Federal Prosecutor §5.23, Centre for
Constitutional Rights, at 7 (filed Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/GermanCase2006/germancase.asp. (based on Rule 17.1.3 press releases)
154. Id. at 16-17.
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United Kingdom has ratified the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR; individual complaints cannot therefore be brought
before the Human Rights Committee. That Committee has
however, used the periodic reporting mechanism to raise the
question of US violations of the rights of detainees in the 'war
on terror','55 as has the Committee Against Torture, when
considering the periodic report of the United States under the
UN Torture Convention. 156 A similarly critical approach has
been evident from UN thematic human rights mechanisms.157
As regards regional human rights mechanisms, the United
States has declined to ratify (though it has signed) the American
Convention on Human Rights. 58 It nevertheless remains subject
to the individual complaint mechanism of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights through the OAS Charter and
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
providing a site of potential claims-making. It is also subject to
the Commission's 'Precautionary Measures ' 59 mechanism,
which has been invoked in relation to Guantinamo detainees. 160
In addition to conventional claims-making in relation to the
United Kingdom under the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), the global aspect of the 'war on terror' has
prompted two novel areas of European legal claims-making. One
has been the result both of the United States' use of secret
detention centres (some of which may have been in
Europe), and of that country's use of 'extraordinary rendition'
flights, crossing multiple national airspaces. In these flights,
suspected terrorists are believed to have been transferred to
countries that practice torture. The use of air space and of
155. See Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee, United States of America, 1$ 12-16, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 (Sept. 15, 2006).
156. Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture, United States of America, 11 13-28, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006).
157. See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Commission on Human
Rights, Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb.
27, 2006) (prepared by Leila Zerrougui, Leandro Despouy Manfred Nowak, Asma
Jahangir, & Paul Hunt).
158. American Convention of Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
159. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Am. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., art 25(1).
160. Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Request for Precautionary Measures,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. (March 13, 2002), 41 ILM 532 (2002).
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possible detention facilities in Europe, has meant that Council
of Europe 161 and European Union 162 mechanisms have becomes
sites, not only for direct challenge to the behaviour of their
member states, but also for indirect challenge to that of the
United States (which has observer status at the Council of
Europe).
The second novel feature of European claims-making has
been the degree to which the British courts have been willing to
accept the 'export' of the ECHR to such conflict-zones as Iraq,
where British troops operate in a way that involves exercise of
the requisite degree of 'control.' 163 This has been by virtue of the
Human Rights Act 1998, which produced a degree of
incorporation of the Convention into domestic law. 164 The effect
of these rulings has been to expose United Kingdom ground
operations where the issue of 'control' arises, to potential ECHR-
based claims-making anywhere on the planet. This points to an
important distinction from air operations, in relation to which
the European Court of Human Rights has taken a markedly
more restrictive approach. 165
LAW, DEMOCRACY AND 'DAMPING' CONFLICT
The effect of the exceptional geographical scope of all of this
claims-making may be to reduce the degree of departure by
161. See generally European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission), Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe
Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities, Council of Europe Doc. CDL-
AD(2006)009 (Mar. 17, 2006); Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights,
Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers of Detainees Involving
Council of Europe Member States, Council of Europe Doc. 10957 (June 12, 2006)
(prepared by Dick Marty).
162. See generally European Parliament Temporary Committee on the Alleged
Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transport and Illegal Detention of
Prisoners, Draft Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the
Transport and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, European Parliament Doc. Provisional
2006/2200 (INI) (Nov. 24, 2006) (prepared by Giovanni Claudio Fava); European
Parliament Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the
CIA for the Transport and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Amendments to the Draft
Report, European Parliament Doc. PE 382.44v02/00 (Jan. 8, 2007) (prepared by
Giovanni Claudio Fava).
163. R. (On the Application of Al-Skeini and Others) v. Secretary of State for
Defence [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 508, 528 (Eng.).
164. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §6.
165. See Bankovid v Belgium & Others, 11 BHRC 435, 454 (2001) (finding that
there is no "jurisdictional link" between victims of air power and the states taking
the military action).
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democratic state actors in the 'war on terror' from previously
accepted legal standards. If Tilly's claim that the democratic
state's mechanisms tend to "dampen the processes that generate
violent contention" 166 is correct, law can be seen as one of these
damping mechanisms. Consequently, while some US policy-
makers may react critically to transnational legal challenges to
the United States' pursuit of the 'war on terror,' more far-
sighted policy-makers may be more alive to the possibilities of
overall conflict-damping. If the dynamic hypothesis suggested in
this paper is correct, the effect of legal claims-making may be to
reduce overall violent conflict. Law therefore could be seen, at
least partly, as one of the self-correcting mechanisms of the
democratic state, alongside such other mechanisms as periodic
elections, a free media, and initiatives such as the Iraq Study
Group report.167
It is relatively easy to imagine how the behaviour of state
actors in the 'war on terror' might be damped, but what of non-
state actors-of potential terrorists? In the case of individual
terrorists willing to employ indiscriminate violence and/or to act
as suicide bombers, the possibility of their behaviour also being
'damped' seems remote, depending as it does on some notions of
reciprocity. But as the Northern Ireland example illustrates,
this limiting effect may depend not simply on the attitude of
violent activists but also on the disposition of the communal
support base (possibly a narrow one) from which activists
spring. If patterns from Northern Ireland replicate themselves,
avoidance of indiscriminate or egregious repression could be
expected to reduce the kinds of communal toleration and
support, most conducive to the emergence of violent activism.
Further research around this question is required, but such
research needs to be informed by a model of legal dynamism
much different from that evident in dominant anti-terrorist
discourse.
166. CHARLES TILLY, supra note 13, at 44.
167. JAMES A. BAKER ET. AL., IRAQ STuDY GROUP REPORT: THE WAY FORWARD -
A NEW APPROACH (2006).
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